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Bitcoin and Ethereum are frequently promoted as 
decentralized, but developers and academics question 
their actual decentralization. This motivates further 
experiments with public permissionless blockchains to 
achieve decentralization along technical, economic, 
and political lines. The distribution of tokenized voting 
rights aims for political decentralization. Tokenized 
voting rights achieved notoriety within the nascent field 
of decentralized finance (DeFi) in 2020. As an 
alternative to centralized crypto-asset exchanges and 
lending platforms (owned by companies like Coinbase 
and Celsius), DeFi developers typically create non-
custodial projects that are not majority-owned or 
managed by legal entities. Holders of tokenized voting 
rights can instead govern DeFi projects. To scrutinize 
DeFi’s distributed governance strategies, we conducted 
a multiple-case study of non-custodial, Ethereum-based 
DeFi projects: Uniswap, Maker, SushiSwap, Yearn 
Finance, and UMA.  Our findings are novel and 
surprising: quantitative evaluations of DeFi’s 
distributed governance strategies reveal a failure to 
achieve political decentralization.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
In January 2021, Uniswap became the first non-
custodial crypto-asset exchange to reach USD $100 
billion trading volume – a significant event for the 
nascent field of decentralized finance (DeFi). DeFi 
projects are typically governed by online communities 
of anonymous stakeholders rather than companies or 
public institutions. Instead of registered shareholders’ 
voting rights, many DeFi projects involve tokenized 
voting rights, and they offer unregulated financial 
services that are based on crypto-assets instead of 
sovereign currencies. For DeFi, the meaning of 
‘decentralized’ thus entails independence from 
regulated companies, investor registration processes, 
and central banks [1, 2, 3]. The descriptor 
‘decentralized’ does not necessarily denote a uniform 
distribution of capital or voting power [4]. Political 
decentralization is anything but guaranteed.  
In 1856, the historian Alexis de Tocqueville [5] 
investigated the fall of the French aristocracy and the 
subsequent dissolution of power. Contrary to the 
revolutionaries’ expectations, the abolition of feudalism 
in France at the end of the 18th century did not 
effectively limit the power of all central authorities. 
Authority putatively transferred from the aristocracy to 
the people, yet there soon emerged a powerful 
bureaucratic system known as the Première République. 
“When a nation abolishes aristocracy,” De Tocqueville 
concluded, “centralization follows as a matter of course: 
everything tends toward unity of power, and it requires 
no small contrivance to maintain divisions of authority.”  
De Tocqueville’s maxim retains an air of truth in the 
era of putatively decentralized networks like Bitcoin and 
Ethereum. The ideals of decentralization that inspired 
the invention of Bitcoin and Ethereum are undermined 
by tendencies towards socio-political centralization [6, 
7, 8, 9, 10] and technical centralization [11, 12]. 
Developers and active members of crypto-asset 
communities are aware of these tendencies; hence they 
propose novel, experimental strategies to achieve 
decentralization. DeFi projects are the most prominent 
decentralization experiments from late 2020 [2]. Many 
entail strategies to distribute tradable voting rights 
tokens (also known as governance tokens) for the sake 
of political decentralization [1].  







DeFi’s voting rights tokens are speculative crypto-
assets, not backed by anything physical [13]. They 
enable token-holders to iteratively revise a project’s 
rules, parameters, and features. A broad range of DeFi 
projects issue voting rights tokens, from non-custodial 
crypto-asset exchanges to derivatives platforms [1]. 
Maker – a non-custodial crypto-asset lending platform – 
initiated the trend with its MKR token.  
Uniswap is the largest non-custodial, Ethereum-
based exchange. Uniswap issued its voting rights token 
(UNI) in September 2020 via a retrospective airdrop. 
The airdrop rewarded anonymous wallet owners that 
interacted with the Uniswap exchange in the past (by 
swapping tokens or providing liquidity). UNI token-
holders today govern the Uniswap exchange. They have 
the right to vote on proposals that pertain to treasury 
funds and changes to the exchange’s rules; and, if they 
wish, they can sell their UNI tokens on various crypto-
asset exchanges, or they can purchase more UNI tokens 
to increase their voting power. As of 9 June 2021, the 
UNI token is in the top 10 list of crypto-assets (sorted 
by market capitalization), and it sells for more than four 
times its initial price of $5.  
While academic research has addressed crypto-
assets, Bitcoin, Ethereum, algorithmic governance, and 
the various meanings of ‘decentralization,’ non-
custodial DeFi projects are comparatively uncharted 
territory, and tokenized voting rights issued by DeFi 
projects are an under-researched topic. It is not yet 
known if De Tocqueville’s pessimism about 
decentralization remains valid for DeFi’s distributed 
voting rights; hence we formulated the following 
research questions. How did major, Ethereum-based 
DeFi projects distribute voting rights? What are the 
outcomes of the different distribution strategies?  
We conducted  an exploratory, multiple-case study 
in response to these questions [14]. We selected as cases 
five non-custodial, Ethereum-based DeFi projects that 
include tradable voting rights tokens: Uniswap, Maker, 
SushiSwap, Yearn Finance, and UMA. Our case 
selection covers four major DeFi categories [1]: lending 
(Maker), exchanges (Uniswap and SushiSwap), assets 
(Yearn Finance), and derivatives (UMA). We selected 
two exchanges instead of just one exchange, because 
SushiSwap essentially began as a clone of Uniswap.  
We followed a mixed methods approach [15], which 
is recognized for its ability to discover the unexpected. 
First, we qualitatively analyzed project documentation 
that details the properties and the distribution strategy 
for each case’s tokenized voting rights. We then 
quantitatively examined the “physical” artifact [14], 
based on methods proposed by Gochhayat et al. [11]. 
We specifically used metrics that quantify the degree of 
uniformity for each case’s distribution of voting rights 
tokens.  
2. Background: The promise of 
‘decentralization’ 
Bitcoin is the fastest asset to reach a $1 trillion 
market capitalization [16]. It achieved this feat with no 
legal entity attached to it as a manager or a majority 
owner. Bitcoin’s pseudonymous creator, Satoshi 
Nakamoto, established a finite supply (21 million units 
of BTC) that cannot be altered by a central bank or any 
other financial authority [17]. Bitcoin transactions are 
not registered on servers owned by a single bank, 
financial institution, or consortium; the Bitcoin ledger is 
instead distributed across a global computing network 
that consists of voluntary participants [18]. In 
comparison with sovereign currencies, physical 
commodities, and other tangible assets, Bitcoin is 
difficult to regulate or subject to capital controls [19, 
20].  
Social scientists often interpret Bitcoin as a 
symptom of widespread distrust in both financial and 
political institutions following the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis [6, 8]. The raw hex data from Bitcoin’s 
genesis block, mined by Nakamoto on 3 January 2009, 
contains within it The Times’ daily headline: 
“Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks.” 
Sociologists class Bitcoin’s early adopters as 
fundamentalist libertarians, many of whom conceive 
‘decentralization’ as a set of economic and political 
ideals [10, 21]. De Filippi & Loveluck [6] traced the 
Bitcoin community’s conception of ‘decentralization’ to 
“Friedrich Hayek’s and Milton Friedman’s ambition to 
end the monopoly of nation-states.”  
The ideals of decentralization enjoy a broad appeal 
among libertarians. For the libertarian Right, 
decentralization’s principal mission is to end the 
oligopoly of banks and tax authorities, and to create a 
market without costly intermediaries and powerful 
regulators. For the libertarian Left, decentralization’s 
principal mission is to abolish centralized monetary 
policy and State capital controls [6, 22]. There is no 
necessary link, however, between the Bitcoin 
community’s ideals of decentralization and an 
actualized, uniform distribution of capital or voting 
power within the Bitcoin network [9, 23]. As Kostakis 
& Giotitsas [4] put it, “in theory you have equipotential 
individuals (that is, everyone can potentially participate 
in a project), but in practice what one gets is 




2.1. Bitcoin’s re-centralization and unregulated 
store of value 
On the one hand, Bitcoin exhibits non-uniform 
distributions of capital, governance authority, and 
computing power, which together imply a failure to 
achieve decentralization. On the other hand, the Bitcoin 
network poses a challenge to centralized legal 
authorities and regulators, which means it is indeed 
‘decentralized’ in the anti-establishment, libertarian 
sense. 
According to the Gini index, capital (BTC) is 
distributed less evenly in the Bitcoin network than it is 
in economies like South Africa or Brazil [23, 24]. The 
2015 block-size debate and subsequent revision to the 
Bitcoin protocol rules demonstrated the concentrated 
governance power held by the Bitcoin Core Developers 
and the Lead Developer [6, 9]. In addition, costly 
mining hardware (application-specific integrated 
circuits, or ASICs), owned by a sophisticated minority 
of Bitcoin miners, offers evidence of concentrated 
computing power [11, 12, 25]. Today, one private 
company in China, Bitmain, dominates the global ASIC 
production industry [26], and it owns the Bitcoin mining 
pools AntPool and BTC.com. These pools together 
comprise over 20% of the Bitcoin network’s hash rate 
(Figure 1 – data retrieved from btc.com on 7 June 2021).  
 
Figure 1. Mining pools dominate  
the hash rate 
The Bitcoin network does, however, successfully 
manifest this libertarian ideal of decentralization: it is 
uncontrollable or unregulatable. Since the global 
Bitcoin network is diffuse and not wholly grounded in 
any specific jurisdiction, it is a challenge for regulators 
[27, 28, 29]. The Bitcoin network is also a challenge to 
regulate because there is no legal entity attached to it as 
a manager or a majority owner. In legal terms, Bitcoin 
can thus be classified as an “unincorporated distributed 
ledger system” [3]. Lawmakers also struggle to define 
the legal status of Bitcoin’s store of value (BTC) [19]; 
hence regulatory responses to BTC are incoherent and 
autarkic [27].  
2.2. Ethereum’s unregulated contracts, non-
liable organizations, and centralized traits 
Ethereum introduced its own, unregulated store of 
value (ETH) in 2015; but, more importantly for the 
present study, Ethereum also introduced unregulated 
chain code, referred to as smart contracts [30]. Smart 
contracts do not require an intermediary authority to 
execute them – another variation on the theme of 
‘decentralization’ [10]. Smart contracts can bind 
together members of decentralized autonomous 
organizations (DAOs), and they can also assign voting 
rights  [31].  
A DAO is a protocol that ‘lives’ on the Internet and 
consists of formalized rules [31]. If truly decentralized, 
no single entity (including a DAO’s creator) can alter, 
reverse, or control a DAO once it is deployed on the 
Internet. A DAO is virtually unregulatable and non-
liable: it simply executes its pre-determined set of ‘if-
then’ rules [2, 32]. If a DeFi project delegates 
management duties to an online community instead of a 
legal entity, then it is effectively a DAO [1, 2]. 
Like Bitcoin, the Ethereum network is sometimes 
criticized for its compromised or failed decentralization 
[11, 25]. Researchers cast doubt upon Ethereum’s 
ability to abolish corporate intermediaries and usher in 
a “decentralized world” [25, 33]. In 2016, Ethereum’s 
core developers exercised autocratic powers [8, 34, 35] 
and established a new fork of the blockchain, in 
response to a disastrous hack. De Tocqueville’s maxim 
thus applies to Ethereum’s governance as well: 
“centralization follows as a matter of course” [5]. 
2.3. DeFi projects not bound to regulated 
companies: centralized, once again? 
The year 2020 witnessed multi-billion-dollar trading 
volumes for Ethereum-based financial services projects 
that do not rely on regulated, custodial intermediaries 
such as banks, brokerages, or company-governed 
exchanges [1, 3, 36]. These projects – commonly 
categorized as DeFi – include non-custodial crypto-
asset exchanges, lending platforms, and derivatives 
platforms [1]. DeFi projects are often governed by a 
non-liable DAO rather than a legal entity [2, 3]; hence 




exchanges and lending platforms owned by regulated 
companies like Coinbase and Celsius.  
DeFi exchanges like Uniswap and SushiSwap allow 
participants to vote for proposed changes to rules, 
parameters, and features, so long as the participants 
purchase or else earn voting rights tokens (via 
contributions to the exchange) [13]. This phenomenon 
can be interpreted in at least two distinct ways: (a) 
governance is decentralized, because decision-making 
power is distributed among a community of token-
holders (and therefore not held by a centralized 
company or institution), and (b) governance is 
timocratic, since voting rights are exclusively attributed 
to ‘property owners’ (in this case, token-holders). The 
second interpretation is especially pertinent to 
SushiSwap. On 7 September 2020, a small group of 
individuals held the majority of voting rights tokens, and 
they successfully seized control of the exchange [37]. 
De Tocqueville’s maxim, once again, rings true.  
A DeFi project named Yearn Finance pre-empted 
outcomes like this, hence it deployed a refined fair 
launch strategy. Fair launch strategies vary from case to 
case; but in general, a fair launch does not allocate a 
large portion of pre-mined (spontaneously generated) 
tokens to developers or early investors and advisors 
[38]. A fair launch is premised on the following 
assumption: if a significant portion of voting rights 
tokens are distributed to privileged insiders, then it is 
difficult to describe a project’s governance as 
decentralized. The fair launch is a sub-topic of Ethereum 
tokenomics and token distribution strategies [13, 39, 
40].  
Yearn Finance’s fair launch strategy, deployed in 
July 2020, distributed none of the project’s voting rights 
tokens (YFI) to developers and early investors. Yearn 
Finance’s fair launch did not abolish timocracy, since 
only YFI token-holders possess voting rights. What its 
fair launch did, specifically, is remove the distinction 
between ‘insiders’ (that are allocated voting rights by 
default) and ‘outsiders’ (that must either purchase 
voting rights on exchanges, provide liquidity, or 
contribute work to the project). Other DeFi projects, 
such as Beefy Finance, Harvest Finance, and YAM, 
later deployed fair launch strategies as well.  
DeFi’s various fair launch strategies indicate new 
avenues for research into algorithmic governance and 
political decentralization, set against a backdrop of 
timocracy, re-centralization, and concentrated powers. 
3. Methods 
To understand DeFi’s tokenized voting rights and to 
evaluate the success of various distribution strategies, 
we conducted an exploratory, multiple-case study [14] 
with a mixed methods approach [15]. For the sake of 
consistent quantitative data extraction, we only chose 
DeFi projects that utilize Ethereum, and we only used 
Etherscan. We limited our study to Ethereum, because 
it has more daily transactions than rival ledgers like the 
Binance Smart Chain, Solana, and Terra. We selected 
distributions of voting rights tokens that have a market 
capitalization of more than $1 billion. Four of our cases 
cover distinct DeFi categories [1]: lending (Maker), 
exchanges (Uniswap), assets (Yearn Finance), and 
derivatives (UMA). We added a fifth case, SushiSwap, 
because of its close relation to Uniswap plus the fact that 
SushiSwap issued voting rights tokens before Uniswap 
did. The initial version of SushiSwap, dated 26 August 
2020, derived most of its smart contract code from 
Uniswap Version 2 [41]. At the time, there was one 
major distinction between the two exchanges: holders of 
voting rights tokens could govern SushiSwap, whereas 
developers governed Uniswap. This distinction proved 
short-lived. On 16 September 2020, Uniswap’s 
developers altered their governance plans and launched 
a voting rights token (UNI) [42]. Table 1 provides an 
overview of our selected cases.  
 
Table 1. Selected projects for a 
multiple-case study 
Project Market cap* Categorization 
Uniswap $21,058,088,732 Exchange 
Maker $3,272,720,932 Lending  
SushiSwap $2,086,130,878 Exchange 
Yearn Finance $1,888,059,030 Assets 
UMA $1,489,888,679 Derivatives 
* Data source: CoinMarketCap (14 May 2021). 
 
Case studies are generally used to explore 
contemporary phenomena that are not easily 
distinguishable from their context [14]. For phenomena 
that involve a high degree of “explorability”, case 
studies allow researchers to gather insights about 
motivations, to discover causal links, and to explain why 
singular events occurred [43]. Within the nascent and 
under-researched field of DeFi [1, 2, 3], we assume that 
the case study method is valid. 
Case studies build on a combination of six evidence 
sources: interviews, documentation, direct observations, 




artifacts [14]. Since each DeFi case that we selected is 
open source, we could draw on several of these sources 
(Table 2). We relied on project documentation to 
identify differences among the cases’ voting rights 
tokens and distribution strategies, and we used 
Etherscan to analyze the Ethereum blockchain and the 
distribution of voting rights tokens over time.  
Table 2. Sources of case study data 
Type Description 
(1) Documentation (1) 145 pages of blog entries (2) 94 pages of whitepapers* 
(2) “Physical” artifact (1) ERC-20 tokens on the Ethereum blockchain 
* Maker and Uniswap each have a formal whitepaper. Our three other 
cases do not.  
 
We adopted the two-stage process proposed by 
Miles et al. [44] to scrutinize each case’s 
documentation. Firstly, we considered the 
documentation individually and assigned initial codes. 
As a team of researchers, we convened regularly to 
review the emerging concepts and to ensure consistency 
in the coding system [45]. For the second stage, we 
clustered codes and assigned them to higher-level 
themes that emerged contingently via data collection 
(inductive coding) or else pertained to an existing 
hypothesis (deductive coding). Table 3 gives a brief 
example of our study’s deductive and inductive coding. 






“UNI is a tradable asset 
and functions like most 
other standard ERC-20 
tokens, except it has a 
deeper power as a 
voting mechanism.” 









“Delegating UNI binds 
the voting power of 
your tokens to an 
address so it may be 
used to vote.” 
Delegating 









For the second data source, using Etherscan, we 
retrieved the addresses that hold any of the tokens that 
correspond to voting units at two separate time points: t 
(24 May 2021) and (t – 6) months. This allowed us to 
evaluate the case’s decentrality at the present state and 
the change of decentrality over time. From the yielded 
data, we excluded automata’s smart contract addresses, 
because automata typically do not exercise voting rights 
or participate in governance processes. For the cases in 
which voting either takes place on-chain or voting rights 
are staked on-chain, we excluded the addresses with 
balances lower than the transaction fee (gas), since they 
cannot afford to cast a vote. We subtracted the balance 
of these excluded addresses from the overall token 
supply. We then bundled together the balances of 
addresses that have the same owner (for example, 
exchanges like Binance, Huobi, or KuCoin) and 
assumed that addresses with unknown owners belong to 
different individuals. As a consequence of this final 
assumption, our analysis presents the ‘best case’ 
scenario regarding the decentrality of the voting rights 
tokens.  
Table 4. Quantitative data collection 




Yearn Finance 35,471 
UMA 13,891 
  
We based our analysis on the number of accounts 
specified in Table 4 and the relevant account balances. 
Our conception of ‘political decentralization’ is based 
on the decentrality of voting rights tokens. To evaluate 
the decentrality of each case’s voting rights tokens, we 
relied on seven metrics. For details about the seven 
metrics and their respective equations, please refer to 
Gochhayat et al. [11]. The seven metrics are: 
1. Normalized Fairness (NF) [46]: A decentralized 
system would have higher fairness, because every 
participant would have equal voting power. 
2. Normalized Shannon’s Entropy (NSE) [47]: A 
centralized token distribution would have low 
entropy, since a few participants would heavily 
affect every decision. 
3. Gini coefficient (G) [48]: A decentralized token 
distribution would have a low Gini coefficient, 
since most address holders would have equal voting 
power. 
4. Cosine Similarity (CS): A decentralized token 
distribution would have high similarity with a 
system in which every address has equal voting 
power.  
5. Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) [49]: A 
decentralized system would have a high degree of 
divergence from a system in which few participants 
have the majority of the voting power. 
6. Normalized Euclidean Distance (NED): A 




degree of distance from a system in which every 
address owner has equal voting power. 
7. Soergel Distance (SD):  The same holds as for 
NED.  
For the sake of a casual comparison or analogy, we 
cited findings from Gochhayat et al. [11] about the 
decentrality of the “governance layer” for both Bitcoin 
and Ethereum. We normalized our computed metrics (or 
replaced the non-normalized metrics with normalized 
versions) to assess the values in the [0,1] interval.  
4. Findings 
4.1. Properties of voting rights tokens  
The voting rights tokens we studied are case-specific 
(Table 5). They have only three things in common: the 
tokens are all fungible and Ethereum-based (ERC-20), 
they grant holders the right to vote on community 
proposals, and they can be traded on crypto-asset 
exchanges. There are not many entitlements that are pre-
determined by developers. In a figurative sense, voting 
rights tokens grant holders permission to enter the 
Senate Floor and cast votes on the measures of the day, 
which are contingent and thus not pre-determined.  
Table 5. Voting rights tokens’ properties by 






















































UNI X X X    
MKR X X  X   
SUSHI X X   X  
YFI X X     
UMA X     X 
 
The projects’ documentation, in total, specifies just 
four unique entitlements for holders of voting rights 
tokens: treasury management power (UNI), collateral 
selection power (MKR), a staking reward (xSUSHI for 
SUSHI holders), and dispute resolution power (UMA).  
Uniswap’s documentation mentions a community 
treasury. Uniswap’s developers created the community 
treasury and allocated to it 43% of the total token supply 
(430 million UNI). The developers ceded control of the 
treasury to UNI token-holders on 18 October 2020.  UNI 
token-holders could then “vote to allocate UNI towards 
grants, strategic partnerships, governance initiatives, 
[…] and other programs” [42]. The documentation’s 
language is purposefully unspecific, because it is not 
possible to predict what decisions the UNI token-
holders will make over time about the treasury funds or 
about particular proposals for changes to the project. 
Uniswap’s forum participants can pose questions about 
the project’s governance; but only UNI token-holders 
(and their delegates) can determine what proposals are 
formalized as executable code, then they can vote to 
implement or reject the selected proposals.   
Maker’s documentation specifies the ability of MKR 
token-holders to vote on what Ethereum-based assets 
are used as collateral by the lending platform. The MKR 
token-holders also vote on the collateral’s 
corresponding risk parameters. (Volatile Ethereum-
based assets are likely attributed strict risk parameters, 
whereas stable Ethereum-based assets are likely 
attributed lenient risk parameters.) Maker’s forum 
participants can formulate proposals for votes, not just 
MKR token-holders. MKR token-holders can elect 
Active Proposals, then they can exercise their right to 
vote on the Active Proposals. The first selection process 
for MKR token-holders is called proposal polling; the 
second process is called Executive Voting. 
SushiSwap’s SUSHI token can be staked on the 
exchange. Holders then receive a tokenized derivative 
(xSUSHI) as a reward. The SushiSwap exchange 
charges participants a 0.3% trading fee. A small portion 
(0.05%) of this trading fee is used to generate the 
xSUSHI tokens, which are then allocated to the holders 
of staked SUSHI tokens. At any time on the exchange, 
holders can convert the xSUSHI derivative to SUSHI. 
(The xSUSHI/SUSHI exchange rate is variable.) Only 
SUSHI token-holders can select what forum proposals 
are put up for a vote, then they can exercise their right 
to vote on the selected proposals. 
UMA token-holders can likewise exercise their right 
to vote on proposals that emerge from the UMA 
community forum. In addition to this, UMA token-
holders have an exclusive right to cast dispute resolution 
votes via the UMA Voter dApp. The work required to 
resolve disputes generates new UMA tokens (as 
payment for the work). The UMA token supply is thus 
inflationary. There are two grounds for disputes: 
incorrect crowd-sourced (off-chain) pricing 
information, and contracts liquidated for an improper 
reason. UMA token-holders can assess the disputes and 
verify the pricing data and liquidation data. UMA 
employs this system, named the Data Verification 




Yearn Finance’s project documentation does not 
specify any unique entitlements for YFI token-holders. 
Forum participants can formulate proposals – any 
proposal whatsoever – without needing to hold YFI. YFI 
token-holders can then choose what proposals are put up 
for a vote, and they can exercise their right to vote on 
the selected proposals.  
4.2. Token distribution strategies  
Distribution strategies are especially important for 
voting rights tokens, since the token distribution 
determines how many individuals can exercise control 
over a project and how much voting power individuals 
possess. Our five DeFi cases all aimed for distributed 
governance, yet each case deployed a different token 
distribution strategy.  
MKR tokens were pre-mined (and thus not produced 
by the work or stake of the lending platform’s 
participants) and sold via an exchange. Some UNI 
tokens were pre-mined; others were produced by the 
stake of the exchange’s participants. UMA’s initial 
token supply was pre-mined, but as noted, UMA’s 
inflationary supply is generated by dispute resolution 
work. Neither SUSHI nor YFI tokens were pre-mined. 
It follows that SushiSwap and Yearn Finance are our 
only two cases to deploy a fair launch strategy (which 
precludes pre-mined tokens).   
Yearn Finance’s YFI tokens must be earnt via 
contributions to the project (such as liquidity provision) 
or else purchased via crypto-asset exchanges. Since the 
YFI tokens were released in accordance with a strict fair 
launch policy, no tokens were distributed to developers. 
Yearn Finance’s developers consequently lacked capital 
and could not afford to pay a third party to audit the YFI 
token’s smart contract code. Yearn Finance’s fair launch 
strategy thus increased the risk placed upon the 
community of YFI holders and offered a lack of 
traditional auditing guarantees. The outcome is 
ambiguous: the distribution of voting power incurs a 
distribution of risk.  
 SushiSwap’s fair launch is also ambiguous, but its 
details differ notably from those of Yearn Finance’s fair 
launch. No SUSHI tokens were pre-mined and allocated 
to privileged insiders like venture capitalists, but 10% of 
all SUSHI tokens generated by the exchange’s liquidity 
providers automatically transferred to a treasury 
accessible only by developers. On 5 September 2020, a 
pseudonymous core developer, Chef Nomi, sold over 
$13 million worth of SUSHI tokens from the SushiSwap 
treasury. In response to community protests and public 
criticism, Chef Nomi apologized on Twitter and 
returned the funds to the SushiSwap treasury six days 
later; but nothing guaranteed this outcome. 
4.3. Decentrality of the token distributions 
The decentrality of our five cases’ voting rights 
tokens is very low. We therefore deduce that, for each 
of our cases, the voting power is highly concentrated. 
    1 - NF 1 - NSE G 1 - CS JSD NED SD 
Bitcoin [11] t = 2.4.2020 0.850 0.315 0.821 - - - - 
Ethereum [11] t = 7.4.2020 0.962 0.438 0.904 - - - - 
Uniswap 
t – 6 months 0.99974 0.61173 0.98810 0.98362 0.88687 0.99178 0.99980 
t = 24.5.2021 0.99980 0.59213 0.99132 0.98568 0.89963 0.99281 0.99955 
Maker 
t – 6 months 0.99941 0.57847 0.99491 0.97534 0.91246 0.98759 0.98757 
t = 24.5.2021 0.99938 0.55255 0.99475 0.97489 0.91257 0.98737 0.98557 
SushiSwap 
t – 6 months 0.99870 0.46674 0.98724 0.96364 0.85819 0.98165 0.99999 
t = 24.5.2021 0.99908 0.46918 0.99098 0.96952 0.88238 0.98464 0.99999 
Yearn Finance 
t – 6 months 0.99786 0.38747 0.91224 0.95725 0.64872 0.96148 0.91483 
t = 24.5.2021 0.99892 0.46993 0.98290 0.96671 0.83568 0.98322 0.96033 
UMA 
t – 6 months 0.99886 0.67603 0.99635 0.96421 0.93759 0.98194 0.99985 
t = 24.5.2021 0.99921 0.65222 0.99651 0.97056 0.93797 0.98517 0.99974 




Table 6 presents our quantitative measurements together 
with the analogous measurements by Gochhayat et al. 
[11]. For the sake of a clearer overview, we changed the 
direction of the metrics NF, NSE, and CS in the table by 
subtracting their normalized values from 1. As a result, 
high values indicate centralization.  
The two cases that adopted a fair launch strategy, 
Yearn Finance and SushiSwap, have token distributions 
that are relatively less centralized than the other cases’ 
token distributions. This aside, the distribution of YFI 
tokens tended towards centralization after the tokens’ 
inception in July 2020. Likewise, the distribution of 
SUSHI tokens tended towards centralization after their 
inception in August 2020. The distribution of YFI 
tokens started with a greater degree of decentrality, and 
it remains less centralized than the distribution of 
SUSHI tokens. This might be caused by the 10% 
allocation of SUSHI tokens to the SushiSwap treasury. 
UMA tokens are the most centralized. Two other 
cases that did not deploy a fair launch, Maker and 
Uniswap, are almost identical. The former’s token 
distribution is slightly less centralized. The 
centralization of UNI tokens is largely attributable to the 
launch strategy that allocated 40% of UNI tokens to 
Uniswap’s developers, early investors, and advisors. As 
of 24 May 2021, if automata’s smart contract addresses 
are excluded, then just 23 addresses control more than 
50% of the active token supply. (The active supply 
excludes the tokens that are held by smart contract 
addresses.)  
5. Discussion and outlook 
De Tocqueville’s maxim about re-centralization can 
be rehashed for DeFi. Our multiple-case study yields a 
significant finding: decentralization is not actualized in 
the sense of evenly distributed voting power, even 
though decentralization is achieved in the sense of 
independence from centralized legal authorities and 
regulated companies. In political terms, hopes for 
evenly distributed, democratic governance are presently 
unfounded in our five selected cases, including the two 
cases that deployed a fair launch strategy. The measured 
distribution outcomes reveal concentrated voting power 
for all five cases (in comparison with a hypothetical, 
fully decentralized case in which each address would 
have equal voting rights).  
In response to our findings, one cannot overlook the 
power of large token-holders, commonly nicknamed 
whales. Whales thwart the ambitions of Yearn Finance, 
along with other DAOs, to evenly distribute tokens and 
network resources [35]. Granular analysis of our data 
revealed that for Yearn Finance, 50% of the active token 
supply is controlled by just 21 accounts. These 21 
accounts can potentially collude and exercise massive 
voting power. If they act together as a ‘whale pod,’ they 
can also manipulate token value via ‘pump-and-dump’ 
schemes [50]. 
Regulation limits the power of whales in traditional 
financial markets. Whales can swim freely by 
comparison in DeFi’s murky waters. The unique value 
proposition of DeFi projects – that is, the type of 
decentralization that DeFi projects actually achieve – is 
the ability to bypass regulation and ‘live’ on the 
Ethereum network [2, 3, 36]. Ethereum’s 
“unincorporated distributed ledger technology” has the 
potential to “undermine traditional forms of 
accountability” as well as erode the “effectiveness of 
traditional financial regulation and enforcement” [3]. In 
addition, DeFi’s anonymous transactions and lack of 
KYC/AML checks are predictable concerns for 
regulators [51, 3, 52, 29, 20].   
DeFi thus rehashes and intensifies the Bitcoin and 
Ethereum networks’ history of regulatory challenges. In 
response, researchers and developers could turn to what 
Zetzsche et al. [3] describe as embedded regulation 
– regulators’ objectives and limits hard-coded into a 
financial services platform. Embedded regulation could 
hypothetically limit the power of whales, for the sake of 
political decentralization. There is no guarantee, 
however, that embedded regulation will find success 
among DeFi communities and crypto-asset investors. A 
successful or prominent case of embedded regulation 
does not yet exist.  
6. Conclusion 
Non-custodial DeFi projects typically do not involve 
sovereign currencies, investor registration processes, or 
a corporate office located within a particular 
jurisdiction; and they are not managed or majority-
owned by legal entities [3]. This motivated our 
exploratory, multiple-case study of five Ethereum-based 
DeFi projects and their tradable voting rights tokens: 
Uniswap, Maker, SushiSwap, Yearn Finance, and 
UMA. Our core finding is that each case’s token 
distribution strategy failed to achieve measurable 
decentrality. In theory, voting rights tokens enable 
decentralized, community-based governance; but 
according to our measurements, the control of major 
DeFi projects is highly centralized.  
We acknowledge the limitations of metrics used to 
assess decentrality as well as the fact that different 




however, that our measured outcomes reflect reality. We 
employed a variety of metrics from different categories. 
Each metric indicated that, for all our cases, the 
distribution of voting rights tokens began centralized, 
and as time progressed, the distribution became even 
more centralized (Table 6). Each of the metrics we 
computed for our cases exhibit centralization. This 
means that the fair launch strategies deployed by Yearn 
Finance and SushiSwap achieved little success.  
The nascent field of DeFi offers multiple avenues for 
future research. The concentrated voting power, general 
motives, and trading activities of DeFi whales are under-
researched topics. DeFi forum posts about whales, DeFi 
communities’ voting proposals to limit the power of 
whales, and DeFi commentaries by social media 
influencers represent valuable data sources for future 
social-scientific research. Legal scholars can investigate 
why non-custodial DeFi projects are especially 
challenging for regulators, and they can study 
developers’ embedded regulation experiments.  
DeFi’s genuine novelty consists in the relationship 
between its distributed governance and regulators. What 
regulators face is both ironic and serious – a politically 
centralized yet globally diffuse form of control over 
multi-billion-dollar financial services. This form of 
control cannot be seized, limited, or broken up under 
current regimes.  
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